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Abstract— Powerful software tools are used by the 
aerospace and power generation communities to check 
codes for errors.  The Software Validation Project at Edge 
Hill University (http://www.edgehill.ac.uk) in collaboration 
with SimCon Ltd (http://www.simconglobal.com) has 
applied these tools to WRF, the most widely used program 
for modeling climate and weather. Preliminary results have 
been generated.  Although the WRF code has been found to 
be of a very high standard, some errors have been identified, 
both in the code and in the compilers used to build it.  An 
aim of the project is to use CASE tools to correct some 
classes of error automatically.  This paper discusses the 
classes of error that have been identified to date, presents 
the initial findings from the investigations performed by the 
project team. 
 
Index Terms— Quality Assurance; Automated Software 
Engineering; Error Removal 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The successful validation and verification of climate 
models is an essential aspect of studies in and predictions 
of climate behaviour.  The Weather Research and 
Forecasting  Model (WRF) [1] developed under the aegis 
of the University Corporation for Atmospheric Research  
(UCAR) and the Unified Model (UM) [2] developed by 
the UK Meteorological Office are two major examples of 
such models.  
Although the procedures used for quality assurance in 
the models are systematic and are well established in the 
software engineering world, they are unable to reveal the 
existence of many types of error. Furthermore, having 
found an error they are often unable quickly to identify 
and correct the source or sources of the error.  Many 
software development tools are available to software 
engineers but the majority is targeted at recently 
developed languages and methodologies.   
In contrast, climate models have been developed over 
many years and have stayed loyal to their original 
languages - overwhelmingly Fortran and C. WRF and 
UM are both sets of Fortran programs. In addition, the 
need to provide complex build mechanisms for a range of 
platforms, multiprocessor architectures and compilers has 
meant that the Fortran source code may not available in a 
form that software development tools supporting Fortran 
are able to analyse. 
The Software Validation Project (SVP) at Edge Hill 
University aims to enhance the efforts of development 
teams typified by the maintainers of WRF and UM by 
applying powerful software tools used by the aerospace 
and power generation communities to check codes for 
errors. To this end the project team selected WRF for 
initial investigation since its source code and build 
procedures are publicly available. It then considered how 
one particular software development tool for Fortran, 
WinFPT, could analyse WRF and report on issues within 
the code that had been hidden from the WRF developers. 
This paper reports on the techniques used and the issues 
revealed.  
The aim of this project is to perform a study of WRF, 
not in relation to the climatological model but in terms of 
quality assurance of the software.  The WRF program is 
of considerable academic interest because of the modern 
Fortran style in which it is written.  Major Fortran 
programs in aerospace, power generation, medical 
research and defence, are almost exclusively written in a 
style best described as extended Fortran 77.  In contrast, 
WRF uses most of the features of (at least) Fortran 2003.  
The purpose of the project is to understand the 
implications for code quality and the types of error which 
occur when a modern Fortran dialect is utilised for a large 
scale implementation. 
The objectives of the project are: 
• to analyse WRF to identify errors; 
• to demonstrate the complete absence of certain 
classes of error; 
• to correct any errors identified, sometimes 
automatically; 
• to evaluate the effects of the errors and of the 
corrections. 
II. EXISTING QUALITY ASSURANCE PROCEDURES 
There are quality assurance techniques that are 
currently used to overcome challenges facing High 
Performance Computing (HPC) specifically based in 
scientific software development [3][4][5]. One commonly 
occurring theme is the use of older programming 
languages due to the length of time these programs have 
been under development [5]. In this section the quality 
control procedures for two major Fortran based scientific 
software projects, WRF and UM, are briefly described 
and critiqued. 
 
WRF Quality Assurance Procedures 
The practices adopted by the WRF development 
teams aim to introduce measures for quality assurance 
throughout the design and build process.  These include 
the development of coding standards to adopt within the 
model, along with identified use of version control tools 
[6]. 
To support the continual development of WRF, 
working groups have produced test suites and test 
procedures [7] to test the code.  This has been supported 
by the formation of the Developmental Testbed Center 
(DTC) which has provided on-going support and 
incremental testing of WRF for reference configurations 
(RC) [8].  Evaluation procedures undertaken on releases 
of WRF include 
1. Automated tests to capture coding errors which 
cause the compilation to fail 
2. Manual tests conducted to evaluate the scientific 
output from the model for accuracy 
3. Real-time tests for stability and integration 
checking 
4. Pre- and post-processing tests for diagnostic and 
graphics systems 
5. Architectural tests to evaluate builds on multiple 
architectures and/or compilers [9] 
However, concerns may be raised regarding the tests 
which are performed in relation to the quality assurance 
of the code base.  The automated tests for regression 
testing determine only whether the execution of the code 
completes successfully.  The output generated by the 
code is not considered in this suite of tests.  Therefore 
there may exist differences in the output of the modules 
following compilation and execution which are not 
identified following the successful completion of the 
automated tests.   
Manual testing, on the other hand, is a slow and 
laborious process which exercises a much smaller number 
of well understood test cases.  The impact upon cases 
which have not been tested is unknown. Potentially 
worse, the cases that are tested may produce results 
which appear to be more accurate but the execution paths 
that  generate those results may be totally unexpected and 
lead to significant impact in other cases which have not 
been tested, or in future tests.  The automated and manual 
tests are not guaranteed to uncover issues related to 
numerical drift. Also they would not uncover errors 
which were introduced in the compilation process related, 
not to the code base itself, but to the compilers used to 
build the model.  WRF is designed not to be tightly 
coupled to machine architecture or compiler.  Thus there 
exists an opportunity for different compilers to generate 
executables which produce dissimilar output from the 
model, a situation which is acknowledged by the DTC 
[8].  In both cases, automated relative debugging 
techniques would assist in identifying changes in between 
the outputs of different builds, and therefore the 
underlying causes may be resolved [10], Automated 
debugging processes described in this paper would enable 
the output from large number of test cases can be 
evaluated at multiple points within the execution of the 
test cases without significant intervention from the user. 
 
UM Quality Assurance Procedures 
The United Kingdom Meteorological Office (Met 
Office) has developed a long term strategy in order to 
address the challenges surrounding quality assurance of 
the code base.  One major challenge faced is ‘the 
prediction challenge’; computational science does not 
have the predictive reliability of traditional 
methodologies [11]. To meet this challenge, the Met 
Office developed an approach of Flexible Configuration 
Management (FCM) to manage its Unified Model (UM) 
[12]. FCM is combined with a rigorous structure and 
processes that dictate the rest of the quality assurance 
procedures [13].  
One such procedure which has been adopted within 
the QA strategy has been the comparison of visualisations 
of model output between implementations and executions 
of the model [13].  The underlying notion is that any 
differences between the visualization will indicate that an 
error has been introduced as revisions and updates have 
been applied to the model.  However, whilst this may 
reveal differences between the executions of the different 
versions of the model, it is unlikely to reveal errors 
common to both versions. This is the same situation as 
arises in manual testing of the WRF model. Correct 
identification and interpretation of the visual differences 
and familiarity with the code are needed to remove the 
errors causing the differences.  There is also the 
possibility that smaller, seemingly insignificant, errors at 
this stage in development could pass this stage of QA and 
cause problems in future developments. 
Two further procedures are undertaken as part of the 
QA process which also fail to reveal errors that have been 
introduced into the model.  These are the automatic 
checking for bit comparison between outputs of different 
runs, and the formal comparison of results from other 
model implementations [13]. Neither would support the 
identification of numerical drift caused, for example, by a 
compiler choosing to keep different variables in registers 
because of changes to the code. While these comparisons 
can, in most cases, establish differences in 
implementations of models, both of these processes 
makes it difficult to track back from the differences 
identified to the source, or sources, of those differences. 
III. THE CASE TOOL 
In this project, WRF is analysed and re-engineered by 
a computer aided software engineering (CASE) tool.  The 
tool used is WinFPT (http://www.simconglobal.com).    
WinFPT: 
• reads the entire program like a compiler; 
• analyses the program and data flow across all 
modules and sub-programs; 
• identifies many classes of error and 
inconsistency; 
• optionally re-engineers and re-writes the code to 
measure behaviour at run-time; 
• optionally re-engineers and re-writes the code to 
correct some classes of error. 
 
WinFPT carries out static analysis of the code.  It can 
also instrument the code for some classes of dynamic 
analysis.  For example, counters can be inserted for test 
coverage analysis to measure the number of times each 
statement is executed.  Also code execution and the 
values of variables can be traced for relative debugging, 
exposing differences in the behaviours of different 
compilers. 
IV. ANALYSING WRF 
The WRF program is distributed as pre-processor 
source files, with the file name extensions .”F” and 
.”F90” (Upper case “F”).  The build procedure generates 
code for specific parallel environments and compilers, 
and converts these files to standard Fortran files with the 
extension “.f90”.  The pre-processing is carried out by a 
special purpose C program, standard.c, and by the C 
language pre-processor, cpp.  The textual changes made 
in pre-processing are extensive.  The first pre-processing 
step strips all of the comments from the code, and cpp 
collapses white space characters between the tokens.   
WinFPT cannot analyse or re-engineer the pre-
processor source code.  The analysis is carried out on the 
intermediate, compilable, “.f90” Fortran files.  This does 
not affect the error detection, but it creates two 
difficulties if the re-engineered code is to be built and 
run.  Firstly, the entire build procedure has to be re-
written to start with Fortran files instead of pre-processor 
code.  Secondly, any automatic corrections made by 
WinFPT are made on files from which the comments 
have already been stripped.  The corrected code cannot, 
therefore, be reintroduced into the WRF distribution. 
 
WRF Program Metrics 
The code analysed contained 624,555 lines of Fortran 
which, as stated earlier, have been developed using a 
modern dialect of Fortran.  Table 1, below, shows a 
comparison between WRF and a typical aerospace 
engineering code.  “Radar” is the signal processing and 
instrument control of a tracking radar system.    
The most important difference between the style of 
WRF and of the Radar code is in the use of Fortran 
modules.  A third of the sub-programs, and all of the 
shared data in WRF, reside in modules.  In the Radar 
code most of the sub-programs are written in separate 
files linked at the top level, and the shared data are in 
COMMON blocks written in include files.  The 
disadvantage for the Radar code is that the fragmentary 
organisation of sub-programs and the need to control 
memory allocation in COMMON blocks provides 
significant scope for error.  The advantage is that any 
routine can be changed, and the Radar program can be re-
linked in 20 seconds.  The corresponding time to change 
a routine in WRF is typically 20 minutes. 
The most important difference between the style of 
WRF and of the Radar code is in the use of Fortran 
modules.  A third of the sub-programs, and all of the 
shared data in WRF, reside in modules.  In the Radar 
code most of the sub-programs are written in separate 
files linked at the top level, and the shared data are in 
COMMON blocks written in include files.  The 
disadvantage for the Radar code is that the fragmentary 
organisation of sub-programs and the need to control 
memory allocation in COMMON blocks provides 
significant scope for error.  The advantage is that any 
routine can be changed, and the Radar program can be re-
linked in 20 seconds.  The corresponding time to change 
a routine in WRF is typically 20 minutes. 
The count of comments in WRF is distorted by the 
pre-processor standard.c, which strips the text of the 
comments and leaves blank lines.  The count of include 
files is also distorted by the use of the c pre-processor 
#include directive.  The analysis was carried out on code 
which was already pre-processed and the include files 
were therefore already inserted inline. 
V. ERRORS IN WRF 
The static analyses performed on WRF include checks 
for: 
• inconsistent sub-program arguments; 
• errors in addressing within COMMON blocks 
and EQUIVALENCE structures; 
• objects forced to mis-aligned addresses; 
• accidental loss of precision in expressions; 
• variables read before they are initialised; 
• unintended whole array assignments; 
• failures in overloaded assignments of derived 
types; 
• unreachable code sections 
 
The results are described in the following sections. 
 
Inconsistent Sub-program Arguments 
A check is made that all actual sub-program 
arguments are consistent with the formal arguments in the 
sub-program declarations in: 
  
Table 1.  Comparison of WRF with a typical Aerospace Engineering Code 
 
                                      WRFV3.4          Radar   
Files 
  Primary files                           392           1589   
  Include files                             3           1891   
                                                               
Code and comments                                              
  Declaration lines                    139724          49831   
  Executable lines                     331732         100203   
  Total code lines                     471456         150034   
                                                               
  Comment text lines                    72984         236033   
  Comment separator lines               19084           7942   
  Blank lines                           61031          87402   
  Total comment lines                  153099         331377   
                                                               
  Total lines                          624555         481411   
                                                               
  Trailing comments                     33014          27907   
  Words in comments                    577601         662221   
 
Program units 
  Programs                                  4             38   
  Block Data                                0             11   
  Modules                                 216              0   
  COMMON Blocks                             1            110   
  Subroutines                            2764           2021   
  Functions                                29             21   
  Module subroutines                     1267              0   
  Module Functions                        198              0   
  Internal subroutines                     30            233   
  Internal Functions                        2              1   
  Additional entries                        0              0   
  Generic interfaces                       56              0   
  Specific interfaces                      93              0   
  Unresolved references (C/Assembler)     250            103 
 
• data type; 
• data kind (e.g. 4-byte or 8-byte REAL numbers); 
• protocol (e.g. passed by reference, by value or by 
address and length); 
• intent (i.e. whether input, output or both input and 
output); 
• array bounds.  Note that these should conform but 
need not be identical since sub-arrays may be 
passed. 
 
A simple analysis shows 2353 occurrences of 
inconsistent arguments, affecting 375 different sub-
programs in the Fortran code in WRF version 3.4.   
However, 1002 of these are situations where the shapes 
of arrays are re-mapped across the subroutine call-site.  
Several hundred more are data type inconsistencies where 
the data passed are simply moved to other processors or 
threads and the data type is not important.  449 
inconsistencies are situations where the formal and actual 
arguments are of type CHARACTER, both have 
specified lengths and the lengths are different.  This 
works without error on most, but not all, compilers. 
Detailed analysis of the analysis shows surprisingly 
few situations where the inconsistency is likely to cause a 
problem.  The difficulty is that there are so many 
harmless inconsistencies that it is difficult to find the 
genuine errors.  The example shown above is unusual. 
Errors in the intent of arguments are of two types.  
Sometimes a constant or an expression is passed as an 
argument into a sub-program and may be written to.  An 
example is shown in Figure 1.  Here, the actual argument 
is a Fortran parameter (a constant) but the formal 
argument, “fieldtype”, can be written to.   Errors like this 
are unlikely to be serious.  If the called routine attempts 
to write to the constant the program will probably crash.  
If the program does not crash, the write probably never 
takes place.  This is unlikely to produce incorrect results.  
The second class of intent error, where the intent of the 
formal argument is declared incorrectly, is far more 
serious and is discussed below. 
 
Errors in Intent Declarations 
In Fortran, a sub-program argument may be declared 
to be INTENT (IN), INTENT (OUT) or INTENT 
(INOUT).  These declarations are almost always optional.  
In making an intent declaration, the programmer asserts 
that an argument: 
• is read by the sub-program, but never written: 
INTENT (IN); 
• is written to in the sub-program but not read 
before it is written: INTENT (OUT); 
• may be read before it is written and may be 
written to: INTENT (INOUT).   
 
If an argument is declared INTENT(IN) the compiler 
need not (and perhaps should not) export the value of the 
argument when control returns from the sub-program.  If 
an argument is declared INTENT(OUT) the compiler 
need not import the value of the argument into the sub-
program when it is called. 
Compilers compile sub-programs one at a time.  Most 
compilers recognise simple intent errors if the intent 
assertion is violated directly in the sub-program code.  
They do not recognise an error if the argument is passed 
down into another sub-program which violates the 
assertion.  The analysis tools track the intent and read-
write status of every argument through the entire call-
tree.  There are three possible problems: 
• the argument is declared INTENT (IN) and can 
be written to.  This is always an error.  There are 
142 occurrences in WRF version 3.4 
• the argument is declared INTENT (OUT) and is 
always read before it is written to.  This is also 
always an error.  There are 62 occurrences in WRF 
version 3.4. 
• the argument is declared INTENT (OUT) and it 
is possible that it is read before it is written to.  The 
issue here is that the program flow may be data 
dependent and unclear.  There is a risk of error.  
There are 1,322 occurrences in WRF. 
 
It is possible to correct all intent errors automatically.  
For example, if an INTENT (IN) argument is written to, 
the argument can be copied to a temporary variable on 
entry to the routine and the temporary used instead.  The 
problem is in deciding what the programmer intended to 
happen. Should the correction honour the INTENT (IN) 
declaration, or should the INTENT declaration be 
changed to reflect the behaviour of the code?  There is a 
strong probability that compilers always ignore intent 
declarations when compiling the data passing protocol of 
an argument, and the authors have verified this for two 
important compilers.  The authors plan to correct the code 
by honouring the INTENT (IN) declarations and to test 
WRF to determine whether there is any change in 
behaviour. 
 
Anomalies in Expressions 
WRF version 3.4 contains 4,722 anomalies in 
arithmetic or character expressions.  Most of these 
involve: 
• loss of precision; 
• testing of equality of REAL numbers 
• truncation of character strings. 
In WRF there are 235 occurences of loss of precision 
where exponents are single precision rather than double 
precision.  There are also 940 occurrences of 8-byte 
REAL variables being assigned from 4-byte real values 
which results in 4-byte precision.  It is common practice 
to compute a derivative to 4-byte precision and to 
integrate the result to 8-byte precision. 
Switches are available in the WRF build procedure to 
promote all REAL objects to REAL*8.  These may 
overcome the problem, but it is not clear that these 
switches change both the storage allocation and the 
numerical values stored on all systems. 
There are 675 occurrences where real or complex 
values are tested for exact equality, as in the example in 
Figure 4 below.  If this is to avoid a division by zero, it is 
likely that a tolerance should be introduced into the test.  
Again, all of these anomalies  can be corrected 
automatically.  
 
Variables which are read before they are initialized 
Static analysis shows 322 variables which are read in 
the code before any values are written to them.  This may 
be an underestimate because the analysis only shows 
situations where the program flow is unambiguous.  
However, in many cases the variables are reported as read 
because they are passed into sub-programs, and it is not 
certain that the sub-programs actually read them.  
Dynamic analysis, where the WRF program is run under 
different compilers, has revealed differences in behaviour 
caused by uninitialised variables, and a study is planned 
to investigate this rigorously. 
 
Failures in Overloaded Assignments of Derived Types 
Fortran supports the assignment of variables of 
derived types.  If A and B are both of the same derived 
type, the statement “A = B” copies all of the components 
of B to A. 
Fortran also allows the assignment of derived types to 
be overloaded.  A subroutine is written to carry out a 
modified copy operation.  The subroutine is declared to 
overload the assignment operator by an “INTERFACE 
ASSIGNMENT (=)” construct. 
A problem with this language construct is that if any 
error is made in the scope or declaration of the 
“INTERFACEASSIGNMENT (=)” the overload fails and 
the variables of the derived type are simply copied 
silently and without any apparent error.   
There is only one INTERFACE ASSIGNMENT (=) 
construct in WRF.  It occurs in ESMF_time.F90.  This is 
the only INTERFACE ASSIGNMENT (=) construct 
which the authors have encountered in the analysis of 
several tens of millions of lines of Fortran.  The module 
in which it is written has a global PRIVATE statement, 
and the interface is not declared to be public.  It is 
therefore not exported from the module and the 
overloaded assignment sometimes fails.  The situation is 
made worse by a bug in the Intel compiler which causes 
the interface to be exported when the subroutine used to 
make the copy is exported.  Therefore, WRF works as 
intended when compiled by the Intel compiler and as 
written when compiled by the gnu (and probably every 
other) compiler. 
The authors suggest that a construct which is used 
only once in many millions of lines of code, and which 
has a 100% failure record, should probably be avoided. 
 
Unreachable Code 
There are 552 unreachable sections of code in the 
version of WRF which was analysed.  Most of these may 
be deliberate.  The analysis tools can only be used on the 
intermediate Fortran files produced during the build 
procedure, and these files are pre-processed for a specific 
architecture.  Some of the pre-processing inserts jumps 
around sections of the code. 
The number of unreachable sections is sufficiently 
small that a manual analysis can be carried out, and this 
will be done in the future. 
 
Errors which do not occur in WRF 
Certain classes of error do not occur in WRF.  The 
analyses carried out show: 
• Errors in COMMON blocks: Programs written 
in an extended Fortran 77 style usually contain 
COMMON blocks, sometimes with many thousands of 
variables.  Errors in the organisation of COMMON 
blocks are common.   WRF has one COMMON block 
which contains only 6 scalar variables.  There are no 
errors in COMMON blocks in WRF. 
• Mis-aligned Addresses: In extended Fortran 77 
code, COMMON blocks, EQUIVALENCE statements, 
sequence derived type and structure constructs sometimes 
force variables to mis-aligned addresses where, for 
example, a REAL*4 object does not start on an address 
which is a multiple of 4.  This causes inefficiency, and 
occasionally compiler errors.  WRF contains only 77 
EQUIVALENCE statements and only one COMMON 
block.  The code contains no mis-aligned objects. 
• Unintended Whole Array assignments:  Fortran 
allows assignments of the form “A = x” where A is an 
array and x is a scalar variable.  All elements of A receive 
the value of x.  This is dangerous.  The authors have 
encountered many examples of the form: 
  DO i=1,10 
     A = B(i) 
  ENDDO 
where the programmer intended to write: 
  DO i=1,10 
     A(i) = B(i) 
  ENDDO 
There are no errors of this type in WRF. 
 
VI. COMPARISON OF THE ERRORS IN WRF WITH A 
TYPICAL AEROSPACE CODE 
 
It is a reasonable assumption that the modern style of 
WRF should have protected the code from many classes 
of error.  A comparison with the Radar code is shown in 
Table 2 below.  WRF is larger than the Radar code and 
the error counts are therefore shown in the right-hand 
columns of the table as the number of anomalies per 
thousand code lines.   
In WRF, there are 150 occurrences of constants or 
expressions which are passed to routines which could 
write to them.  The radar code has only 2.  The difference 
is probably a consequence of the very large number of 
sub-program arguments used in WRF.  As noted above, it 
is unlikely that WRF actually writes to these arguments. 
WRF has 142 INTENT (IN) errors and 62 confirmed 
INTENT (OUT) errors.  The Radar code has none 
because it contains no INTENT statements.  It is not clear 
that the use of INTENT statements has contributed to the 
quality of the WRF code. 
The Radar code contains hard-coded array references 
out of bounds.  WRF does not.  Some of the out of 
bounds references in the Radar code are deliberate, and 
make use of the tightly controlled memory mapping of 
the COMMON blocks.  Some are accidental, but, because 
of the use of COMMON blocks, at least they are 
consistent errors.   
The remaining anomalies, uninitialised variables, 
inconsistent arguments and anomalies in expressions 
show a similar pattern in the two codes.  This is 
surprising because the WRF code is far more readable 
than the Radar code and the use of modules provides for 
better checking of interfaces and better control of scope.   
VII. CORRECTING AND TESTING THE CODE 
A small number of the anomalies detected can safely 
be corrected by hand.  The correction of the failed 
overloaded assignment, for example, is a one line change.  
In most cases, the correction must be automated.  It is not 
practical to correct 4722 anomalies in expressions 
manually, and the risk of injecting new errors would be 
significant.   
Currently, the CASE tools can correct a proportion of 
the expression anomalies and all of the INTENT (IN) 
errors.  They must be extended to handle the remaining 
expression anomalies and the INTENT (OUT) errors.  
Very few of the mis-matched sub-program arguments 
actually require correction.  It is hoped that those which 
do can be identified and corrected by hand, 
A necessary first step in making the corrections is to 
modify the build procedure so as to rebuild from 
compilable Fortran sources.  The intention is to 
encapsulate the changes made by the pre-processors so 
that the majority of files do not require pre-processing.  
This would make it possible to re-engineer the code once 
before a series of builds instead of re-engineering it for 
every separate build as part of the build process.   
Testing of the changes requires the development of a 
regression test suite.  A coverage analysis of the WRF 
Ideal cases showed that they visited only 18% of the 
executable Fortran statements.  Test material is now 
available which exercises over 50% of the code and this 
will be extended.   
The problem in testing is in comparing the results 
from different runs.  Almost any change in the code is 
likely to inject numerical drift, where small changes are 
cumulated so that the results of two runs show large 
numbers of differences.  A procedure has been developed 
to eliminate numerical drift in single processor runs, and 
it is hoped to extend this procedure for multi-processor 
runs. 
VIII. FURTHER ERROR CHECKS 
Two further error checks have been identified for 
further investigation as they could affect the stability and 
reproducibility of WRF runs.  They are: 
•  a check for the use of optional arguments to sub-
programs.  The issue is that optional arguments could be 
passed down to routines without a check that they are 
present.  If this occurs, the value passed might be that 
from an earlier call to the routine, or might be null.  A 
null argument could crash the program; 
• a check for race conditions in multi-processor and 
multi-threaded runs. 
IX. CONCLUSIONS 
Initial investigation making use of the techniques 
described has enabled a number of issues to be 
discovered.  These issues can be related to coding in the 
model and the compilers used to build the code.  The 
paper discusses three findings from the experiments that 
have been performed.  These represent important 
validation of this technique, and the intention of the 
project is to apply the technique to include broader 
coverage of the WRF model code 
The WRF version 3.4 program contains a little over 
10,000 known coding anomalies.  There are 624,555 code 
lines.  Therefore there is approximately 1 anomaly per 60 
lines (or about 2% of the codebase).  These are anomalies 
in the code, not in the underlying climatological model. 
A large proportion of the anomalies can be corrected 
automatically and work is under way to complete this 
task.  A necessary first step is a revision of the build 
procedure.  A test suite and test analysis tools are under 
development to assess the implications of the anomalies 
identified and to test WRF before any permanent changes 
are made. 
The anomalies found were mostly invisible to the 
existing techniques or could only be revealed by 
considerable effort and knowledge of the source code. In 
contrast, the techniques described in this paper revealed 
the anomalies quickly and in the majority of cases were 
easily remedied. Where the reasons for anomalies were 
not obvious such as the failures in overloaded 
assignments of derived types, analysis of the divergence 
of control paths followed by the instrumented models 
revealed bugs in the program, compiler and the Fortran 
language itself which would have been virtually 
impossible to detect otherwise. 
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